No winners only losers in Lebanese war

Yüksel Söylemez for TDN Sunday, September 3, 2006

It was correct to predict that there would be no winners but losers all round in the futile 35-day Lebanese war between Israel and Hezbollah, with the Lebanese people, who neither needed nor deserved the war, losing the most. Contrary to the proclamations of President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Israel, there were no outright, seemingly clear-cut winners. The leader of Hezbollah, who also claimed victory, now admits that had he known the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers would trigger a war, he "would not have ordered it."
Israel's stated aim, in its self-defense, was to destroy Hezbollah once and for all. In this Israel fell immeasurably short of its target. By fighting against the growing influence and political power of Iran in the Middle East, Israel was engaging in a proxy war with Iran. It far from fulfilled her purpose. In fact the war proved to be counterproductive. Instead of gaining prestige, Israel lost both at home with the Israeli public and more so abroad in the international community. Israel has created more enmity, hate and criticism against itself in the Arab and Islamic world.
As many analysts believe, Israel lost the 35-day war both on tactical and strategic grounds. From the tactical point, Israel lost the fighting ground. The collective and communal punishment operation against the Lebanese people was far from justifiable and was a true tragedy. Israel faced a strong and effective resistance from Hezbollah beyond its expectations: Well trained, well equipped "invincible" Israeli troops had to retreat from Bint Cbeil, which was considered the hub of Hezbollah terror. Israel's image and belief of invincibility have now been reduced to hearsay.
All this added together does not mean that Hezbollah gained a military victory against the Israeli army, either, though the Hezbollah militia stopped, or at least slowed down, the Israeli advance from south Lebanon northwards. This is accepted as a strategic gain for Hezbollah as much as an advantage for Iran and Syria. It is reported that the prestige of Hezbollah has increased amongst the Lebanese people from 58 percent before the war to 80 percent afterwards, which is a strategic advantage for Hezbollah and an apparent strategic disadvantage for Israel for the future.
Israel may have theoretically based its tactics on the fact that the Sunni Lebanese together with Maronite Lebanese Christians would rise against the Shia Hezbollah, blaming them for the destruction of south Lebanon. This theory did not materialize as it was a tactical error of judgment. Israel's collective punishment operation by deliberately destroying civilian life and property and infrastructure as well as military targets united the Lebanese people rather than dividing them as it was designed to do. The result as seen in the immediate aftermath is that Israel lost not only regionally but also globally in the tactical sense.
Of course only time will tell, once the dust has settled, who really won and who really lost in absolute terms in the long run, or what kind of balances will emerge in tomorrow's Middle East from its present rubble and chaos. On the ground no military gain is visible for Israel or Hezbollah after so much destruction and human and material loss. Neither side reached their strategic goal of severely wounding or destroying each other. Israel could not even secure its stated objective, in its own words the cause of the war, the safe return of the two Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah did not secure the release of the Lebanese held in custody in Israeli prisons.
Resolution 1701 of the U.N. Security Council has fallen on hollow ground and is another witness that neither of the warring parties gained anything tangible except a piece of paper with no value or advantage to either side. Now a new Security Council resolution is being sought with some teeth in it.
The big neo-colonial plan was to turn tiny and helpless Lebanon into Israel's satellite and thereby isolate Syria. Historically in the eyes of Syria, Lebanon has always been part of Greater Syria and Israel's big plan was intended to recreate the civil war of the '70s. This 35-day war, as described by the Guardian on July 20 was, to paraphrase, another chapter created by the colonial mind. If so, there will be no end soon. It may be correctly described as a war of independence against colonialism because there are resistance movements like Hamas and Hezbollah with the support of the Arab masses in the Middle East. This is the reason the terrorist label, which has been affixed to the resistance by the Hezbollah militia, is now being questioned.
As the expected quick victory failed to materialize, there is now much soul-searching in Israel. No visible success does not mean defeat for both sides but rather a time for respite and reflection. Israel's existence in the Middle East is a historic fact of life that Hamas and Hezbollah one day have to recognize.
This uncalled for waste of a war may give some useful lessons in hindsight to both sides, such as that violence and force breed nothing but greater violence. Brute force provokes counter reaction, terror multiples itself geometrically with counter terror. There is no alternative but to sit and talk, and talk about two-way concessions, learn to give and take for the sake of peace and security.
The two sides must be looking into what happened in those 35 days of killing and destruction in which they only succeeded in creating rubble and ruin, over of which they can only feel shame, not pride. Both sides should start by apologizing to each other that it was a mistake, more than a mistake, a frenzy, an aberration. Let's hope that out of the ashes can come a new start for a fresh beginning. As I suggested recently in this column, this futile war may create a "catharsis" for inspiration, and why not?